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Simple OLS estimates of the effect of school-imposed penalties for drug use on a student’s 
consumption of marijuana are biased if both are determined by unobservable school or 
individual attributes. The potential reverse causality is also a challenge to retrieving estimates 
of the causal relationship, as the severity of school sanctions may simply reflect the need for 
more-severe sanctions. I offer an instrumental-variables approach to retrieving an estimate of 
the causal response of marijuana use to sanctions and thereby demonstrate the efficacy of 
school-imposed penalties as a deterrent to adolescent drug use. This is the first evidence of 
such efficacy and, given what is known about the consequences of drug use, suggests that 
school sanctions may have important long-run benefits. 
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There is a large literature that documents the long-run costs associated with drug use, and
the implied gains to lowering adolescent drug use are not dicult to establish from existing
research. For example, in an instrumental-variables design, DeSimone (2002) shows that
employment probabilities are substantially reduced by marijuana and cocaine consumption.
Considering the relationship between marijuana use in high school and future earnings,
Ringel et al. (2006) add that a signicant part of the negative relationship between substance
use and earnings reects an indirect mechanism by which early marijuana use aects human
capital accumulation, which in turn aects earnings. The focus of this analysis is on the role
of school policy in determining student's consumption of the most common illicit substance
used by adolescents { marijuana.
Of course, the consequences of substance use are not restricted to labour-market out-
comes. For example, Kaestner (1995) shows that drug users tend to delay marriage and,
conditional on marriage, experience shorter marriage durations. Markowitz (2000) suggests
that marijuana may also cause increased engagement in physical ghts. Substance use has
also been identied as a leading causal factor in suicidal thoughts and behaviours (Markowitz
et al. (2002)). Clearly, there is the potential for a signicant down side associated with ado-
lescent drug use, which should motivate policy makers in their stewardship of adolescents.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the role of school policy in a student's choice to con-
sume drugs has largely been ignored in the economics literature. Yet, among the established
results in the literature, there are several empirical patterns that raise particular concern
around this shortcoming. For example, Chatterji (2006) also shows that marijuana use in
high school is associated with lower levels of educational attainment, and concludes with
an appropriate conjecture that \public policies that are eective in reducing substance use
during high school should have some impact on educational attainment." Based on a re-
lationship between marijuana use and lower high-school graduation rates, Yamada et al.
(1998) also conclude with the suggestion that \high-school-based preventive programs which
discourage alcohol consumption and marijuana use are highly recommended." The literature
has also documented that the earlier one starts using a particular drug the less likely one
is to stop using that drug (van Ours (2006)), which further supports considering the role
of schools in inuencing drug use. To the extent one believes that marijuana is a gateway
to other (harder) substances, the benets to curbing adolescent marijuana use also include
mitigating this potential escalation and any costs associated with such escalation.1
In the end, the existing literature leaves us largely uninformed about the relationship
between school policy and the substance use of youth.2 Yet, there is reason to consider
1Although, Bretteville-Jensen and Jacobi (2008) considers an alternative to a causal link between cannabis
and subsequent hard-drug use, oering non-causal explanations for the observed \staircase" pattern.
2As an exception to the dearth of evidence on the role of institutions in drug use, although somewhat
removed from the focus here, Mehay and Pacula (1999) exploits a drug-testing policy implemented by the
military in 1981 and documents that rates of illicit-drug use among military personnel are signicantly lower
than civilian rates in years after the implementation of the program but not before, which they interpret as
a sizable deterrence eect. Some 30 years have past since this policy change was initiated, though, and the
nature of the policy change does not necessarily map into us learning about the implications of school policy
toward drug use. Exploiting transaction-level data, Pacula et al. (2007) does nd that changes in sanctions
that lower the legal risks for users are associated with higher marijuana prices in the short-run. Anderson
2the inuence of school policy in this regard, with elementary and secondary institutions
well positioned to inuence adolescent choices.3 Thus, the focus of this analysis is on the
potential for school policy to inuence a student's consumption of marijuana.
Specically, I will model one's marijuana use as a function of the the penalty one's school
would impose if one were to be caught consuming an illegal drug. In proceeding toward a
preferred specication, I will be transparent about the empirical regularities in the data
and report simple OLS specications that highlight the endogeneity of penalties in such an
environment. I will then adopt an instrumental-variables approach to retrieving an estimate
of the causal inuence of sanctions on student behaviour and, in the end, demonstrate the
ecacy of school-imposed sanctions { stier sanctions for drug use cause students to be
less likely to consume marijuana. In particular, the preferred estimates are identied o of
variation in penalties imposed on second-time drug oenders across schools that issue the
same penalties to rst-time oenders, with the second-oence penalty instrumented for with
measures of how much the school escalates its penalties for second-time oences (i.e., over
rst-time oenced) in non-drug areas of discipline.
In Section 2, I detail the data used in this analysis. In Section 3, I develop the empirical
model and introduce the instrumental variables to be used to recover causal estimates of
school-imposed penalties on marijuana use. I oer some discussion in Section 4 followed by
concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Data
2.1 Source
For our purpose, the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health is a particularly
tting collection of information on adolescent behaviors as it is designed to investigate ado-
lescent health and risk behaviors. The \Add Health" project is widely considered to be
the largest and most comprehensive survey of adolescents ever undertaken, with a stratied
sample of 80 high schools collectively representative of the U.S. school system with respect
to region of country, urbanicity, school size, school type, and ethnicity. For each of these
schools, \feeder" schools were selected on the basis of student contributions to the chosen
high school. An in-school questionnaire was administered to students in sampled schools be-
tween September 1994 and April 1995, and a random sample was selected from each of these
schools for more detailed interviews, conducted in the respondents' homes between April and
December 1995. It is this detailed \In-Home Survey" that is adopted in the current analysis.
A total of 20,745 adolescents were interviewed for the Wave I In-Home Survey, although
only 19,865 have school and grade identication. After dropping observations with missing
values, the largest sample from which I report estimates is 17,016, or roughly 86 percent of
(2009) also oers some evidence that demand-side interventions to curbing drug use may be ineective at
changing consumption behavior, although this is focussed on methamphetamine use.
3In a related consideration, while the emphasis is more broadly on school crime (e.g., violent incidents),
Cook et al. (2009) argues that crime in school is not a simple sum of students' criminal propensities { \that
the organizational characteristics of the school have considerable inuence."
3the Wave I sample.4 Summary statistics for this sample are shown in Table 1.
2.2 Marijuana
While marijuana has been the most popular illicit substance among youths for some 25 years,
there has been some variation in usage rates across time. With the rst wave of Add Health
collected in 1994/5, one should note that 1992 is generally thought of as a low in adolescent
marijuana use. Marijuana use again rose after 1992.5
In the Add Health survey, the available information about marijuana use derives from
responses to the question, \During the past 30 days, how many times did you use marijuana?"
Roughly 14 percent of Add Health respondents report consuming marijuana in the 30 days
prior to the interview. Given the mass at zero, I will report the results of a discretized version
of this continuous response. For completeness, I will consider the intensive margin separately.
Since I am relying on self-reported participation in potentially sensitive areas of disclosure, I
note that for sensitive topics survey respondents listened to pre-recorded questions through
earphones and entered their answers directly on laptops in order to maintain condentiality
and to minimize the potential for interviewer or parental inuence. Rates of risky behaviors
reported in Add Health are consistent with those measured in other sources (see Mocan and
Tekin (2005), Mocan and Tekin (2006), and Mocan and Tekin (2010)).
2.3 School-imposed penalties
Add Health records the penalties associated with both the rst and second occurrences of
student drug use, which will enable the identication strategy adopted below. Specically,
school administrators report the consequence a student faces when he is caught \using an
illegal drug at school" for the rst time and, separately, caught a second time.
All Add Health schools deal with rst-time oenders with either an in-school suspension,
an out-of-school suspension, or an expulsion. Possibly given the seriousness of drug use in
adolescents, there is a clustering of sorts in how schools penalize drug-related oences. For
example, among the largest sample used here, only four schools (of 132) impose in-school
suspensions to rst-time oenders, while 78 schools issue out-of-school suspensions and 50
schools issue expulsions. Of the 82 schools that do not expel rst-time oenders, 47 schools
will expel students upon a second occurrence.
3 Empirics
Point estimates from a simple model of drug use on school-level penalties for drug-related
oences will be subject to some interpretive challenges. In particular, to the extent schools
respond to higher drug use with more-severe penalties, OLS estimates of this relationship will
4Results are robust to dropping juvenile arrests, arrests per crime, and median household income and
keeping the observations for which these census variables (i.e., the largest source of missing information) are
unavailable.
5Pacula et al. (2000) oer a nice analysis of this trend, linking time-series variation in consumption to
changes in perceptions of the harms associated with regular marijuana use.
4be biased upward. In Section 3.2, I oer an instrumental-variables strategy through which
I retrieve an estimate of the causal role of punishment severity on drug use. In motivating
such a specication, I rst present simple OLS models of the relationship in Section 3.1, and
arrive at the sample of schools that will be used in identifying the causal estimate.
3.1 A baseline specication
Consider a general model of whether individual i has consumed marijuana as a function of
the penalty associated with school-related drug oences,
Marijuanaigs = g + 1Penalty
drugs
s + Xis + igs; (1)
where i is in grade g at school s and Penaltydrugs
s is the severity of penalty at school s (i.e.,
in-school suspension, out-of-school suspension, or expulsion).
Since penalties do not vary within schools, ^ 1 will be identied by the variation in Penalty
that exists across schools. Grade-level xed eects (g) will be included throughout the
analysis, so identication in all cases will be within grade-level, across schools. With no
allowance for the inclusion of school-level xed eects, I will control directly for the observable
heterogeneity across schools with school size (i.e., small, medium, large), governance (i.e.,
public or private), urbanicity (i.e., urban, suburban, rural), and region (i.e., West, Midwest,
South, Northeast).6 I will also include county-level information on juvenile arrests per capita,
arrests per crime, median household income, the proportion urban, the proportion rural, and
the unemployment rate. At the individual level, included in Xis will be indicator variables
for gender, race (i.e., black, Asian, Hispanic, other nonwhite), parent education (i.e., less-
than high school, high school, some college, bachelor, graduate/professional), and religious
participation (i.e., an indicator for weekly attendance). In all specications I report standard
errors that are corrected for clustering at the school level.
As a rst pass, I report the estimated coecients of a linear-probability model of the form
(1), allowing level shifts in marijuana use with each rst- and second-oence penalty observed
in the data.7 Since schools vary in their penalties for rst-time oenders by imposing in-
school suspensions, out-of-school suspensions, or expulsions, I include intercept shifters for
out-of-school-suspensions and expulsions. Since schools vary in second-oence penalties only
between out-of-school suspensions or expulsions, I allow for a dierence in marijuana use by
whether student i's school expels students for second oences.
In Column (1) of Table 2, I cannot reject that any of these dierences are zero { when
uncorrected for endogeneity, there is no measurable dierence in the reported marijuana use
of students associated with their school's disciplinary response. This suggests that schools'
drug-related penalties are ineective in determining adolescent drug use. However, endoge-
nous penalties imply that these estimates are biased upward. There are also no signicant
6Although interesting, many other school-level attributes have insucient variation to consider including
as covariates. For example, greater than 98 percent of schools oer drug awareness and resistance education
programs.
7Results are robust to alternatives to estimating linear probabilities. However, discrete-type IV estima-
tors, which will be required in subsequent specications, assume that the endogenous regressors are continu-
ous and are not appropriate for use with discrete endogenous regressors. Thus, reporting linear probabilities
here allows for better comparison to the subsequent two-stage least squares estimates.
5patterns in drug use revealed when rst- and second-oence punishments are entered sepa-
rately, as reported in columns (2) and (3).
3.2 An instrumental-variables approach
3.2.1 IV setup
In motivating the identication strategy below, one should have in mind an interpretation to
the two penalties associated with drug use at a given school. One reasonable interpretation
is that the penalty for a second occurrence captures what a school is ultimately prepared
to do in response to this behaviour and that the rst, to the extent that it is less severe, is
some measure of grace being aorded to \rst-time oenders." If on point at all, one would
be particularly reluctant to consider the variation in rst-oence punishment as exogenous
to student behaviour, since this \grace" might well be earned (e.g., in response to less drug
use).
In order to retrieve an estimate of the causal eect of penalty severity, I will consider the
variation in second-oence penalties in a sample of schools with common rst-oence penal-
ties. The obvious payo from this restriction is in keeping any unobserved heterogeneity that
is motivating dierences in rst-oence penalties from contributing to the estimated eect
of school-imposed penalties on drug use { of ^ 1. In this environment, I will then instrument
for each school's second-oence penalty. This is arguably the cleanest environment available
for answering the question of interest and will ultimately serve as the preferred specication.
Given the breakdown of penalties, this amounts to restricting the sample of students to
those that attend schools that issue out-of-school suspension to rst-time oenders. In short,
there are too few schools issuing in-school suspensions to reasonably interpret estimates from
separate specication and there is no comparable specication for students who are at schools
that treat rst oences with expulsion, as their second-oence consequences are irrelevant.8
This highlights a tradeo in the identication strategy { achieving cleaner identication by
restricting the sample of schools by their rst-oence penalties.
Conditional on being in such a school, then, I instrument for Expulsiondrugs
s in a model
of i's choice to consume marijuana,
Marijuanaigs = g + 1Expulsion
drugs
s + Xis + igs; (2)
where again, i is in grade g at school s and Expulsiondrugs
s is the measure of penalty severity
at school s for students caught using an illegal drug at school for a second time (i.e., an
indicator variable for whether the school expels second-time oenders). In all cases, the
counterfactual to expulsion remains an out-of-school suspension and, as before, errors are
corrected for clustering at the school level.
8As an alternative, one could include xed eects for each rst-oence penalty and instrument for the
variation in second-oence penalties. But, given that second-oence consequences are irrelevant for schools
that already expel rst-time oenders, such an approach would merely add the students from the four schools
that issue in-school suspension. The results are not sensitive to their inclusion and are not reported.
63.2.2 The instruments
As with drug-related occurrences, the School Administrator Questionnaire in the Add Health
survey includes rst- and second-occurrence penalties for a variety of other oences. Being
careful to avoid employing instruments that themselves may inuence drug use and can
not be excluded from the second stage, I instrument for Expulsiondrugs
s with the dierence
in severity between the rst and second penalties associated with other infractions. For
example, with the information on penalties for infractions of type j at school s, a potential
instrument Zj








Across j, this amounts to a set of school-specic \punishment trajectories" that are inde-
pendent of level dierences in penalty severity across schools. Below, I discuss the particular
choice of infractions j, such that Zj
s are unlikely to relate to substance use itself.
In order to quantify penalties (and the dierences between rst and second penalties)
I impose a cardinal ranking on the available penalties. Penalties can range from \verbal
warning" to \expulsion," which I simply map onto the range one through ve.9 As a result,
the higher is a given Zj
s the more school s tends to ramp up the severity across rst and
second oences of type j. For example, if school m imposes an expulsion for a second oence
but only an out-of-school suspension for a rst oence, then Zj
m = 5   4 = 1, which would
be equivalent to school n imposing an out-of-school suspension for a second oence and an
in-school suspension for a rst oence, with Zj
n = 4 3 = 1. Quite clearly, Zj
s is independent
of level dierences in penalty severity across schools.10
Among the trajectories that are arguably excludable, I adopt two as instruments through-
out the analysis { the dierence between rst- and second-oence punishments for \Stealing
school property" and for \Verbally abusing a teacher." The trajectories derived from several
other categories of infraction are not considered as possible instruments, as the exclusion
restrictions in these cases seem problematic. In particular, those related directly to sub-
stance use are unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.11 It is also questionable whether
those associated with other risky behaviours are excludable. Since estimates are not quali-
tatively dierent if they are not included as instruments, I discard them from the estimating
equations.12 The remaining contender, \Cheating," can likely be excluded from the drug
9The full set of possible penalties is, \(1) verbal warning," \(2) minor action," \(3) in-school suspension,"
\(4) out-of-school suspension," and \(5) expulsion." In reality, consequences need not span this entire range,
however. For example, as suggested already, no school imposes less than an \in-school suspension" for drug
oences.
10The benet to identifying o of these trajectories is made all-the-more salient when considering the
evidence oered by Babcock (2009), who suggests that high-school graduation and labor participation out-
comes appear higher for students who attended schools with stricter discipline policies { notably, schools
with higher average punishment levels over a range of disciplinary margins. Also identifying o of levels,
Barton, Coley, and Welingsky (1998) nd that stricter discipline policies in tenth grade to be associated with
lower rates of delinquency in 12th grade.
11These include smoking at school, drinking alcohol at school, possessing alcohol, and possessing an illegal
drug.
12These included ghting with another student, injuring another student, possessing a weapon, and phys-
ically injuring a teacher.
7equation but does not survive redundancy tests and is therefore not included in the reported
specications.13
Therefore, the identifying assumption is that conditional on being in a school that treats
rst-time drug oenders equivalently (using only the variation arising within grade levels and
regions) one's marijuana use is not related to how much one's school increases it's penalty for
stealing school property (or verbally abusing a teacher) between rst and second occurrences.
In Table 3, I report the estimated coecients of a variety of school attributes regressed on
each of the two instruments used below, and P-values associated with the null, H0 : ^  = 0.
I also report P-values for joint F tests on the two instruments together predicting each of
the attributes. In almost all cases, the trajectory implied by the school's treatment of rst
and second non-drug oences does not vary signicantly with these observable attributes.
3.2.3 The IV results
In Column (1) of Table 4 I rst report the OLS results from the sample of schools that
penalize rst-time oenders with out-of-school suspensions. As in Table 2, marijuana use
does not appear to respond to whether these schools expel second-time oenders or issue a
second out-of-school suspension.14 This estimate is, again, an upwardly biased estimate of
the causal inuence of expulsions to the extent that schools respond to drug use with stier
penalties for second-time oenders, even when they share rst-oence penalties.
IV estimates of the inuence of second-oence expulsion on drug use are produced in
Column (2). In short, correcting for the endogeneity of Expulsion reveals a very dierent
relationship between school penalties and adolescent marijuana use. Within grade level and
region, students attending schools that are equivalent with respect to their treatment of rst-
time oenders but that penalize second occurrences with expulsion (instead of suspension)
are signicantly less likely to report that they consume marijuana. The estimated dierence
is also reasonably large, suggesting a .066 decrease in the probability that one has consumed
marijuana in the thirty days prior to the survey where schools expel on second occurrences.
At the mean usage of .15 this implies an impact of roughly 43 percent. The eect size in
moving from out-of-school suspensions to expulsions is to reduce the proportion of students
consuming marijuana by roughly .18 standard deviations.15
In Table 5, I repeat the analysis on the intensive margin, dening Marijuana as the
number of times marijuana was used in the month prior to being interviewed and restricting
the sample to include only those for which Marijuana > 0. First, one will note that the
anticipated bias correction is apparent when the IV estimates in Column (2) are compared
to the OLS estimates in Column (1). Similar patterns also emerge in the IV estimate of
Expulsion, with usage falling some 5.5 over a mean of 12.6 times (monthly), for an impact
of roughly 43 percent and an eect size of roughly .14 standard deviations. Even though this
13Including a cheating trajectory as part of the set of instruments yields slightly higher point estimates
on second-oence expulsion. See Breusch et al. (1999) for details on testing for instrument redundancy.
14In unreported results, restricting the sample to the four schools that issue in-school suspension to rst-
time oenders suggests that the inuence of \Expulsion at 2nd" is a larger positive but, unlike other models,
estimates for this sample of schools are imprecise and sensitive to specication.
15These results are qualitatively robust to a limited information maximum likelihood estimator (LIML),
which can be more robust to the presence of weak instruments. That said, the reported specications yield
rst-stage F statistics that far exceed the weak ID test critical values of Stock and Yogo (2005).
8sample is restricted to students who report using marijuana within the last 30 days, these
estimates are close to those found around the extensive margin of use, reported in Table
4. That said, the IV estimate is imprecise and it would be reasonable to conclude that the
margin of importance is the extensive margin.
4 Discussion
4.1 Falsication
One may fear that expulsion regimes are merely identifying a \type" of student, as reected
in their marijuana use, but not an actual dierence in drug behaviour in response to penalty
severity. In Table 6, I consider a potential falsication of the main result by running a
similar specication but replacing drug use with the student's academic performance. In
Column (1), performance is measured as the grade-point average across the student's four
most-recent classes in English or language arts, mathematics, history or social studies, and
science. As suggested in the results, more-severe consequences for drug use are not predictive
of lower student performance. That expulsions don't also predict grade-based performance
suggests that the above analysis is not merely identifying a \type" of student more broadly.
As a second measure, I consider the student's performance on a variant of the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) that is administered to all survey respondents. The pri-
mary advantage the PPVT has over grade-based performance is that the test scores are
comparable across schools and grades in a way that grade-base performance measures may
not be. Likewise, however, in results reported in Column (2) I nd no systematic variation in
PPVT with the severity of school-imposed penalties for drug use. That there are distinctly
dierent movements in student drug use and student performance around the treatment
variable yields additional support to a causal interpretation.
4.2 Reported drug use
While tempting to consider the point estimate as the underlying true causal eect of penalty
severity on drug usage, one important caveat remains. Notably, one must bear in mind
that the above analysis points to a causal response of reported drug use to a school-imposed
deterrent. The point estimate may still reect both actual reduced usage and reductions in
one's proclivity to report actual use. This is particularly important in this context as both
may respond to drug-related penalties.
For example, both usage and reporting may respond negatively to increases in penalty
severity. That said, care was taken to elicit truthful responses to potentially sensitive areas
of disclosure. For example, the drug-use measure used in the current analysis were collected
via audio-enhanced, computer-assisted self-interviewing protocols (Audio-CASI).16
16Respondents answer the questions themselves, rather than telling the interviewer their answers. \When
you get to the rst question, the computer will read the question to you so that you can hear it through
these headphones. It will also tell you what to do to enter your answer. We have made it very simple for
you to use the computer. Let's take a look at how it works, by completing a couple of practice questions."
95 Conclusion
The focus of this analysis is on the potential for school policy to inuence a student's con-
sumption of marijuana. I model students' marijuana usage as a function of the penalties that
would be imposed by the students' schools on those caught consuming an illegal drug. Given
the potential endogeneity of these penalties, however, I adopt an instrumental-variables strat-
egy to retrieve an estimate of the causal inuence of expulsion on consumption.
In the end, estimates imply that in moving from out-of-school suspensions to expulsions
is to reduce the proportion of students reporting 30-day marijuana consumption by roughly
.18 standard deviations, or a 43 percent decrease from the mean propensity to consume
of .15. I thereby demonstrate the ecacy of school-imposed penalties as a deterrent to
adolescent drug use { the rst evidence of such ecacy. Given what the literature has
documented regarding the consequences of drug use { especially that in younger individuals
{ this research suggests that school sanctions may have important long-run benets.
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12Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean StdDev
Used marijuana in last 30 days 0.14 0.35





Other Non-White 0.01 0.11
Parent Educ: High school 0.25 0.43
Parent Educ: Some college 0.25 0.43
Parent Educ: College 0.12 0.32
Parent Educ: Graduate 0.08 0.27
Weekly religious attendance 0.39 0.49
Unemployment rate, county 0.07 0.02
Proportion urban, county 0.66 0.39
School size: 401-1000 0.34 0.48
School size: 1001-4000 0.52 0.50
School area: Urban 0.30 0.46
School area: Suburban 0.52 0.50
School governance: Private 1.07 0.26
Juvenile Arrests per 100k, county 341.9 155.5
Arrests per crime, county 0.21 0.08
Median HH Income, county 30288 7969
Observations 17,016




VARIABLES schools schools schools
Expulsion on 2nd occurrence 0.007 0.012
(0.013) (0.012)
Expulsion on 1st occurrence -0.012 -0.007
(0.034) (0.031)
Suspension on 1st occurrence -0.031 -0.028
(0.034) (0.032)
Male 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Black -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Hispanic/Latino -0.008 -0.008 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Asian/Pacic -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.090***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Other Non-White -0.044* -0.044* -0.044*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 17,016 17,016 17,016
Grade-level FE yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes
Mean 0.142 0.142 0.142
The dependent variable is equal to one where the student reports to have consumed marijuana
\in the last 30 days." Reported coecients are least-squares estimates. All specications also
include controls for school size (i.e., small, medium, large), governance (i.e., public or private),
and urbanicity (i.e., urban, suburban, rural), county-level juvenile arrests per capita, arrests per
crime, median household income, the proportion urban, proportion rural, and unemployment rate,
individual level indicators for gender, race (i.e., black, Asian, Hispanic, other nonwhite), parent
education (i.e., less-than high school, high school, some college, bachelor, graduate/professional),
and religious participation (i.e., an indicator variable for weekly attendance). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
14Table 3: Correlation of the instruments with mean school attributes
j = \Stealing school j = \Verbally abusing Joint-
property" a teacher" test
Dependent variable Zj
s coecient P-value Zj
s coecient P-value P-value
Age -0.141 0.605 -0.111 0.621 0.798
Proportion black 0.019 0.761 -0.046 0.359 0.602
Proportion Hispanic/Latino -0.014 0.773 -0.014 0.732 0.915
Proportion Asian/Pacic -0.035 0.112 0.008 0.647 0.228
Proportion other non-white -0.003 0.401 -0.000 0.977 0.703
Parent: Proportion high school 0.042 0.274 -0.027 0.390 0.331
Parent: Proportion some college -0.013 0.657 0.009 0.709 0.826
Parent: Proportion college -0.017 0.287 0.031 0.016 0.020
Parent: Proportion graduate -0.021 0.220 0.004 0.775 0.428
Weekly religious attendance 0.043 0.275 0.016 0.624 0.519
Unemployment rate, county -0.002 0.628 -0.009 0.019 0.063
Proportion urban, county -0.148 0.066 -0.078 0.245 0.119
School size: 401-1000 0.100 0.360 -0.012 0.894 0.639
School size: 1001-4000 -0.108 0.317 0.011 0.902 0.590
School area: Urban -0.119 0.248 -0.142 0.092 0.154
School area: Suburban 0.151 0.169 0.123 0.174 0.189
School governance: Private -0.072 0.149 0.005 0.907 0.340
Juvenile arrests per 100k, county -42.755 0.247 -14.674 0.631 0.486
Arrests per crime, county 0.007 0.694 -0.007 0.628 0.801
Median HH income, county -1943.061 0.241 -539.977 0.694 0.490
Each coecient represents a separate specication regressing the attribute on the instrument.
15Table 4: IV estimates of the deterrent eect of expulsion on marijuana use
(1) (2)
VARIABLES OLS IV










Other Non-White -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.028) (0.027)
Observations 11,555 11,555
Grade-level FE yes yes
Region FE yes yes
F (rst-stage) n/a 13.60
Mean 0.153 0.153
Impact (%) 5.841 -43.34
Eect size 0.0248 -0.184
The dependent variable is equal to one where the student reports to have consumed marijuana
\in the last 30 days." Reported coecients are least-squares estimates. All specications also
include controls for school size (i.e., small, medium, large), governance (i.e., public or private),
and urbanicity (i.e., urban, suburban, rural), county-level juvenile arrests per capita, arrests per
crime, median household income, the proportion urban, proportion rural, and unemployment rate,
individual level indicators for gender, race (i.e., black, Asian, Hispanic, other nonwhite), parent
education (i.e., less-than high school, high school, some college, bachelor, graduate/professional),
and religious participation (i.e., an indicator variable for weekly attendance). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
16Table 5: Does the penalty for using illegal drugs inuence the intensive margin?
(1) (2)
VARIABLES OLS IV
Expulsion on 2nd occurrence -1.693 -5.456
(2.530) (3.743)
Observations 1,769 1,769
Grade-level FE yes yes
Region FE yes yes
F (rst-stage) n/a 13.01
Mean 12.57 12.57
Impact (%) -13.47 -43.41
Eect size -0.0439 -0.141
The dependent variable is equal to the number of times the student reports to have consumed
marijuana \in the last 30 days," conditional on consumption greater than zero. Reported coef-
cients are least-squares estimates. All specications also include controls for school size (i.e.,
small, medium, large), governance (i.e., public or private), and urbanicity (i.e., urban, suburban,
rural), county-level juvenile arrests per capita, arrests per crime, median household income, the
proportion urban, proportion rural, and unemployment rate, individual level indicators for gender,
race (i.e., black, Asian, Hispanic, other nonwhite), parent education (i.e., less-than high school,
high school, some college, bachelor, graduate/professional), and religious participation (i.e., an
indicator for weekly attendance). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at
the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
17Table 6: Falsication exercises, using specication of Table 4(2)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES GPA PPVT
Expulsion on 2nd occurrence 0.208 6.289
(0.139) (5.412)
Observations 11424 11058
Grade-level FE yes yes
Region FE yes yes
Mean 2.567 48.40
The dependent variable in Column (1) is the grade-point average in the four most recent classes.
The dependent variable in Column (2) is the student's score on the PPVT. Reported coecients are
least-squares estimates. All specications also include controls for school size (i.e., small, medium,
large), governance (i.e., public or private), and urbanicity (i.e., urban, suburban, rural), county-
level juvenile arrests per capita, arrests per crime, median household income, the proportion urban,
proportion rural, and unemployment rate, individual level indicators for gender, race (i.e., black,
Asian, Hispanic, other nonwhite), parent education (i.e., less-than high school, high school, some
college, bachelor, graduate/professional), and religious participation (i.e., an indicator for weekly
attendance). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the school level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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